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BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE MANDATE TO LAW INSTITUTE

In 1942 Louisiana adopted a comprehensive and modern criminal
code. Prior thereto, for one-hundred-thirty-seven years, Louisiana's
basic law of crimes was contained in a general criminal statute known
as the Crimes Act of 1805. This statute adopted in substance the common law of crimes with respect to the particular offenses that were
enumerated therein. Complaints of the growing confusion,- extended in
breadth and depth by every session of the Legislature through the addition of statutes dealing with particular offenses, were constantly voiced.
Successive efforts to remedy this condition came to naught until the
adoption of the present code. How this accomplishment was achieved
is the subject of this discussion in the thought that such a review may be
of interest and assistance elsewhere.
There should be no need to say that the people of Louisiana are very
much the same as the people in the rest of the country, and this includes,
only by way of emphasis, the Louisiana lawyers. The same objections
were heard here that are within the common knowledge of anyone
familiar with attempts to make comprehensive improvements in the
law. It was claimed that Louisiana had a system of criminal law that
was working very well; under it Louisiana had succeeded in establishing
a very good record in bringing to the bar of justice offenders against
its order; the shortcomings and deficiencies of its system were known
and understood and could be reckoned with; the jurisprudence was
established; any new system would only multiply many fold whatever
confusion existed; a long and laborious, costly and distressing period of
uncertainty would be the fruit of adopting a new criminal code. Present
also was the belief that experienced practitioners would lose the advantage of the special knowledge of the intricacies of the common law
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system and would be no better off than the beginner and that district
attorneys and judges would have to revamp their files of charges, instructions and other forms. These and more were the objections that were
voiced and .that, it may be, had had much to do in thwarting over such
a long period many previous efforts to give Louisiana a comprehensive
criminal code. At the same time there were some important factors
exerting an opposite pull. In the first place, codification, as such, was
native to Louisiana. To talk in terms of a code of laws was to talk in
terms familiar to the Legislature and to the people. On. the civil law
side Louisiana had never known anything but codification. From its
very beginnings as a territory it had functioned under a civil code. To
suggest that it adopt a true criminal code was but to urge that it bring
its system of criminal law up to that of its civil law, and that it finally
consummate an attempt first undertaken by Edward Livingston, one of
the fathers of its civil code. In the second place there were so many
cases of overlapping and duplicating criminal statutes or provisions
that in some imp6rtant areas the law was well nigh incomprehensible.
It was against such a background that the Louisiana Legislature
instructed the Louisiana State Law Institute to prepare a comprehensive and complete criminal code. That the mandate came from the
Legislature attested the fact of interest in the project from its inception
by that all-important body, and also its continued belief that something
could and should be done. The rest of the story is largely a story of the
Louisiana State Law Institute. Since the organization and history of the
Institute are obtainable elsewhere little will be repeated here.' In the
six years of its existence prior to the presentation to the Legislature of
the Projet of a Criminal Code, the Institute had succeeded very well
in establishing itself as a body devoted to the improvement of the law
from an objective point of view as a means of regulating the social
order that was Louisiana's -heritage but without neglecting the habits,
customs and mores of its people. The procedure it had adopted for
the accomplishment of its projects was recognized as calculated to assure
a degree of deliberation and thoroughness that so frequently is unattainable by a legislative body and at the same time a broadness of
experience, vision and understanding that is too often a shortcoming
of a small committee or group. In short, the Louisiana State Law Institute was ideally suited to the preparation of legislation as intimately
concerned with the affairs of the whole people as a Criminal Code.
1. Tucker, The Louisiana State Law Institute, 1 La. L. Rev. 139 (1938); Smith, The
Louisiana State Law Institute, 14 TUL. L. REV. 89 (1939) ; Daggett, The Louisiana State Law
Institute, 22 TEXAS L. REv. 29 (1943).
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BASIC POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ADOPTED

The Institute accepted the mandate addressed to it by the 1940
Legislature as one to prepare a criminal code, true in form as well as
substance, not to make a collection of criminal statutes or even merely
to revise Louisiana's criminal laws. A manifest requirement of this
policy was that, notwithstanding that criminal conduct was to be clearly
defined, general principles should be used in place of detailed and particularized provisions. Whenever possible such conduct was to be defined
in terms that were sufficiently inclusive to cover the limits of criminal
behavior to be subjected to the stated penalty and at the same time
sufficiently specific to avoid the objection of vagueness or uncertainty.
It was realized that the common law rule of strict construction had
operated to convert criminal law draftsmanship into the unacceptable
practice of undertaking specifically to list every varying element of fact
entering into the commission of an offense. Many intricate, inadequate
and unworkable laws had been the fruit of Louisiana's submission to this
principle. Although, of course, the principle nullem crimen sine lege was
to remain in full vigor, no blind distortion of its meaning was to destroy
basic principles of true codification requiring the use of general instead
of specific terms in defining offenses.
The Institute selected for the actual work of drafting the Code the
professors of criminal law of the Loyola, Tulane and Louisiana State
University law schools. It was believed that law faculty members would
be in a better position to take an objective approach to their resDonsibility being relatively free of any personal bias that can so easily be
developed by participation in the active functioning of the law. At the
same time, realizing that many practitioners are given to believe, rightly
or wrongly, that professors are likely to be removed too far from the
play of the law in action to catch the subtler tones and shades from its
many facets, the Institute undertook to provide an assurance of any
needed balance by selecting an advisory group to the reporters made
up of judges presiding over criminal trials and lawyers engaged in criminal law enforcement or specializing in the defense of those charged with
criminal offenses.
Before beginning the work of drafting, a detailed and complete survey was made of the criminal law of Louisiana, in whatever form it
might be found. Much consideration was given also to the criminal law
of other jurisdictions with particular emphasis on criminal law codification. Expert opinion was sought and secured from many sources. In
short, every effort was made to obtain all available information neces-
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sary to produce a code that would reflect the best in thought and
experience.
The reporters addressed themselves to their task in full sympathy
with the adopted objectives. They divided the Code into two main
parts. In the first or general part there were set out the general provisions affecting the specific offenses later to be dealt with. Among
these provisions Were included general definitions of terms used in the
code, rules of interpretation, lesser and included offenses, elements of
crimes, such as intent, culpability, parties and inchoate offenses such as
criminal conspiracy. The remainder or second main part of the code
was devoted to specific offenses. In the drafting of provisions dealing
with specific offenses the reporters adhered closely to the basic objective
of eliminating and avoiding useless distinctions that would serve only
to mystify and confuse and more importantly to destroy effectiveness in
the administration and enforcement of the criminal law. Where related
crimes could be combined and difficult distinctions eliminated they combined them. Instead of inviting the discovery or development of gaps
and sags by particularizing, much care was devoted to the selection of
general terms that it was believed could escape the charge of vagueness
or indefiniteness. Simplification without prejudice to fundamental concepts of individual liberty was the constant objective.
As the work of drafting moved forward, the reporters met with their
advisory staff from time to time and went over in great detail every
proposed article of the new code. In addition to undertaking to pursue
consistently the principles of codification adopted much care was given
to the choice of language for the purpose of assuring that the provisions would be readily understandable. Upon final agreement being
reached on the draft by the reporters and the advisory staff, it was
ready for submission to the Council of the Institute.
ORGANIZATION OF COUNCIL AND METHODS OF REVIEW

The Council, the governing authority of the Institute, is made up of
twenty-two ex-officio and twenty-eight elected members. The members
ex-officio include the officers of the Institute, the Attorney General, the
Executive Counsel to the Governor, and the Chairmen of the judiciary
committees of the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of
Louisiana, the President of the State Bar, the Deans of the Loyola,
Tulane and Louisiana State University Law Schools, and the Louisiana
members of the Council of the American Law Institute. The elected
members include representatives of the Supreme Court, of the Courts
of Appeal, of the District Courts and of the Federal Courts in Lou-
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isiana; three members of each of the three mentioned Law Schools, and
fifteen practicing attorneys chosen at large throughout the state. Although many of the members of the Council might have claimed no
particular expertness in the field of criminal law yet, in point of fact,
many important suggestions came from such members.
In reviewing the draft, the Council did not address itself to its task
perfunctorily. The presentation of every provision was accompanied by
a detailed analysis and explanation of its language, the background
against which it was drawn, and its purpose. Presentation was, of
course, followed by discussion until agreement was reached. Redrafting
and resubmission were frequently required. Needless to say it was often
necessary for the reporters to review at great length developments
based on modern experience and the mature thought of scholars of criminal law and criminology. In some cases proposals were offered that
the Council was unwilling to accept. Some of its decisions have drawn
complaint but the wisdom or unwisdom of its action need not here be
discussed. In any event, instances of this kind further attest the thoroughness of the Council review, if also the unwillingness of the Council
to break with the past where the importance of breaking was not to a
majority of its members sufficiently apparent. They also suggest that
there was little in the draft after adoption that any person unless fired
with a zeal to destroy could find vehemently objectionable.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO PUBLIC AND LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL

Throughout the preparation of the Projet, the Institute remained
constantly aware that its work would come to naught unless found
acceptable by the Legislature. The presence of the key judiciary members of that body as members of the Council assured that a small but
important nucleus of the popular representatives of the people would
be kept abreast of what was being done in the new code and would have
the opportunity to express a voice in adopting the policies as they were
initially developed. Through the Attorney General and the Executive
Counsel to the Governor the administrative side of the state government
would be kept constantly informed. The presence of representatives of
the several courts sitting in Louisiana made it certain that the draft
would reflect the wisdom of the bench and the point of view of those
whose duty it would be to enforce the new code if and when it became
law. From every point of view, no opportunity was lost that would
add to the statute of the Code when submitted or that might be needed
to assure the more skeptical that the ultimate in care and thoroughness
had characterized its preparation.
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The Institute knew also that any determined opposition by the Louisiana Bar would go a long way toward convincing the Legislature that
the proposed code should not be adopted. It had foreseen that opponents of the draft would most likely come from lawyers who had
specialized in defense representation both because the existing state of
the law would be deemed more favorable to successful defense work
than would the improved and clarified system of the new code and
because the possibilities afforded under the old were so well known.
With such thoughts in mind the Institute had included in the advisory
group two of Louisiana's most successful criminal defense lawyers.
These appointments were designed to afford the opportunity to qualified
and able representatives of the viewpoint of the defense to express their
ideas as the work progressed and also to secure a first-hand knowledge
of the problem of drafting the Code from the point of view of the
draftsmen. It was believed that this would go a long way toward dispelling any opposition likely to develop from the criminal defense segment of the bar and at the same time the Institute would be advised of
the arguments most likely to be heard when the adoption of the Code
was being considered.
Since its beginning there had been very close liaison between the Institute and the Louisiana State Bar Association. Many of the more outstanding and active members of the bar were numbered on the Council,
including as already stated the president of the Association. In addition,
the general membership of the Institute included not only all of the judges
of the various courts, federal and state, in Louisiana but a carefully
selected group of one-hundred-and-fifty lawyers who had practiced for at
least ten years. When, therefore, following approval by the Council, the
Institute was ready to present the Projet of a Criminal Code to a meeting
of its general membership, this meant that it would then be reaching a
large and important element of the bar as well.
After the Council had given its approval to the draft it was submitted
to a meeting of the general membership called for such purpose. Copies
had been distributed well in advance of the meeting to afford an ample
opportunity for careful study. The presentation to the Institute members
was hearteningly free of serious attack. Most of the objections raised
were disposed of without difficulty. Certain modifications were made but
only one had the potentiality of being of any real significance. The meeting was unwilling to accept as drafted the provision aimed at forestalling
application by the courts of the rule of strict construction which would
have done much to destroy the effectiveness of the Code.
As originally written, Article 3, on interpretation, suppressed the com-
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mon law rule of strict construction and provided, as it still does, for
genuine construction. In addition, it provided that the draftsmen's notes
should be valid aids in the interpretation of the provisions of the code.
The feeling of the meeting was that the provisions might be found objectionable by the Legislature on the ground that the province of the courts
was being too seriously invaded. The redraft of the article was aimed at
overcoming the possible objections to it in its original form while yet
providing a rule of interpretation inconsistent with the common law rule
of strict construction that, if applied to the code, could seriously cripple it.
Having secured the approval of the general membership, the Council
addressed itself directly to the important matter of general publicity.
Newspaper releases were prepared to acquaint the public with the major
features of the proposed code. In addition, Institute spokesmen presented
the Code before the convention of the Louisiana State Bar Association
and secured the approval of that body. Of course, the fact that so many
leading members of the bench and bar were members of the Institute
and its Council had much to do with the comparative ease that characterized the Institute's efforts to secure approval of the Bar Association.
Finally, when the new Code was introduced simultaneously in both
branches of the Legislature, it bore the names of legislative members
of the Institute in the Senate and the House of Representatives. In
keeping with advance planning a joint hearing was held by the judiciary
committees of the Senate and the House to which it had been referred.
At this hearing Institute spokesmen reviewed the history of the criminal
law in Louisiana, pointed up the many deficiencies of its then existing
system and explained the improvements made. After detailed consideration approval by both committees followed without difficulty. When
the Code came up for final passage only one amendment was voted-a
return to the year and a day rule, the unscientific nature of which had
been so thoroughly exposed in so many quarters. But at any rate Louisiana had a new Criminal Code-after one-hundred-thirty-seven years
of trying.
THE CODE BErORE THE COURTS

Before closing this account a brief review of how the Code has fared
in the courts should be of interest. The new Criminal Code was adopted
by the Legislature in 1942.2 Through the 1948-49 term of the Supreme
Court, twenty-seven cases involving the code were heard and decided.
Although many of the opinions handed down are of general interest in
2.

La. Act 43 of 1942.
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the field of criminal law only those of interest or import from the standpoint of draftsmanship will be here considered.
The first case to reach the court raised the issue of constitutionality
of the act enacting the Code in the light of a constitutional provision
that every law shall embrace but one object and shall have a title indicative of such object. The title of the act indicated simply that it was an
act to adopt a criminal code, define crimes and fix penalties. The court
took the logical view that the object was single and that the title was
indicative thereof.3
Also involved in the case was a charge of unconstitutionality leveled
at Article 67 defining the crime of Theft. The combination into one
crime of the theretofore separate offenses of larceny, obtaining by false
pretenses, embezzlement, and the confidence game constituted one of
the major improvements and an outstanding simplification of the law.
The purpose of the article was to eliminate the difficult, tricky and
confusing common law distinctions between the offenses being dealt
with by using a definition based on the element common to all of them
that the lawful owner had been culpably deprived of his property. The
argument urged upon the court was that the combination of several
distinct crimes under the heading of "theft" rendered the article unconstitutional because it contained more than one object. To this the court
gave the same answer given to the general charge of unconstitutionality
and added that the grouping of offenses of the same character in a
single article was in accordance with the modern trend, followed in
numerous states, of simplifying the law by discarding ancient and outmoded forms and re-defining offenses to prevent confusion and injustices.
The next case of present interest that reached the court raised the
question of whether an offense described in a penal provision of a civil
statute as perjury but without a penalty provided should be treated as
the crime of false swearing under which it would fall in the Criminal
Code. 4 This problem had been considered in the preparation of the
code and the conclusion had been reached that in such a case since the
penalty to be imposed would have to be determined by reference to the
code, the character of the offense would be fixed by the code. The court,
however, took the view that the provision had not been impliedly repealed as in conflict with the code and that the character of the offense
as stated therein was controlling notwithstanding that extra-judicial
false swearing of the kind involved would not be perjury but only the
lesser offense of false swearing under the code. The court indicated
3. State v. Peet, 206 La. 1078, 20 So. 2d 368 (1944).
4. State v. Smith, 207 La. 735, 21 So. 2d 890 (1945).
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clearly that in its opinion all such provisions would control over the more
general provisions in the criminal code.
A problem of considerable importance reached the court during the
1946-47 term.- In Article 104 the offense of maintaining a disorderly
place was defined as the "intentional maintaining of a place to be used
habitually for any illegal or immoral purpose." The argument presented
to the court was that the article was unconstitutional in that the word
"immoral" was vague, indefinite, and uncertain and that it therefore
required the court to decide in every case what would constitute the
immoral purpose within the meaning of the article, a determination
constitutionally resting in the Legislature and not the courts. This was
a case where, in keeping with the accepted civilian theory of codification
on the basis of which the code was drawn, generality of expression was
used instead of specific language in the belief that the word "immoral"
was sufficiently restricted in content to justify the omission of any qualifying term that might result in undesirable limitations in its application. In the final analysis this belief was fastened on the interpretative
provision of Article 3 that all of the provisions of the code were to be
given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their
words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and
with reference to the purpose of the provision. But the court felt otherwise and found the article unconstitutional. Without considering the
question of whether the code should have concerned itself with immoral
as opposed to illegal conduct, an issue itself of some complexity, the
holding of the court in effect constituted a surrender to the AngloAmerican rule of strict construction which is fundamentally inconsistent
with the civilian theory of codification. 6
The same problem was again presented to the court through an attack
on the constitutionality of Article 92 defining the crime of contributing
to the delinquency of juveniles. 7 The crime was defined as the enticing
of a juvenile to "perform any immoral act." Here as in the former case
the court held the word "immoral" inadequate for the purpose of definition in a criminal statute in that it was too vague, general and indefinite.
The following comment was made: "Crimes must be denounced with
such precision that the person sought to be held accountable will know
whether his conduct is such that it falls within the purview of the act
intended to be prohibited." Consistent with this view the court has
5. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So. 2d 758 (1947).
6. See Morrow, Civilian Codification Under Judicial Review:
morality" in Louisiana, 21 TUL. L. REV. 545 (1947).
7. State v. Vallerie, 212 La. 1095, 34 So. 2d 329 (1948).
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held also that the word "indecent" of Article 106 (2) defining the crime
of obscenity is too vague and uncertain."
During the same term the court considered an attack on the constitutionality of Article 81 defining the crime of indecent behavior with
juveniles as the commission of any "lewd or lascivious act upon the
person or in the presence of any child under the age of seventeen, with
the intention of ai'ousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person." 9 In rejecting a claim of vagueness based principally on the
ground that the article failed to explain the meaning of "lewd or lascivious" the court answered that the phrase drew a clear and understandable line between criminal and non-criminal conduct. Adverting to
the previous cases and to its pronouncements concerning the word
"immoral" the -court explained that the latter term is of such broad
import that it was impossible to declare with any degree of certainty
the type of conduct the Legislature sought to prohibit and that because
of the vast difference of opinion as to the sort of behavior that might
be considered as immoral the judge or jury would be required to apply
his or its own conception of morals, thereby assuming the exercise of
power given to the Legislature.' °
In defining the crime of negligent homicide in Article 32, the violation
of a statute or ordinance was made presumptive evidence of criminal
negligence. This provision was attacked on the ground that it destroyed
the presumption of innocence guaranteed to the defendant by the due
process clause of the federal constitution.' The contention was rejected, the court observing that the article did not relieve the state of
the burden of proving beyond any reasonable doubt every element of
the crime charged, that is, the homicide, the criminal negligence of the
defendant, and the fact that such negligence was the proximate cause of
the homicide.
In addition to material already cited, further discussions of the code
and of the jurisprudence thereunder have appeared from time to time
and are readily obtainable.' 2 By and large there is room for considerable
8. State v. Kraft, 214 La. 351, 37 So. 2d 815 (1948).
9. State v. Siabold, 213 La. 415, 34- So. 2d 909 (1948).
10. Articles 92 and 104 of the Criminal Code have now been amended and re-enacted
with the word "sexually" added before the word "immoral" with a view to satisfying the
constitutional requirement of certainty. See La. Acts 388 and 389 of 1948.
11. State v. Nix, 211 La. 865, 31 So. 2d 1 (1947).
12. Smith, The Louisiana Criminal Code-(Its Background and General Plan), 5. LA. L.
REV. 1 (1942) ; Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code: .4 Comparison with Prior Louisiana
Criminal Law, 5 LA. L. REV. 6 (1942); Wilson, The Louisiana Criminal Code: Making the
Punishment Fit the Criminal, 5 LA. L. REV. 53 (1942); Morrow, The Proposed Louisiana
Criminal Code, 15 TUL. L. REV. 415 (1941) ; Morrow, The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942Opportunities Lost and Challenges Yet Unanswered, 17 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1942); Morrow,
Louisiana Blueprint: Cizilian Codification and Legal Method for State and Nation, 17 TUL.
L. REV. 351, 535 (1943) ; Comments included in Surveys of the 'ork of the Louisiana Supreme

1950]

LOUISIANA CRIMINAL CODE

satisfaction in the fact that the initial adoption of a criminal code in
Louisiana has proved to be a successful and noteworthy accomplishment
notwithstanding that in some respects the possibilities for improvement
have not been exhausted. In this regard there is perhaps greater need
as well as opportunity for a more realistic and enlightened judicial approach, the key in the final analysis to legislative success. Yet despite
some opportunities for criticism, on the whole the Code has been construed fairly and liberally. There is, at the same time, some basis for
believing that the Courts will tend more and more to a recognition of
their responsibility, as provided by Article 3, to give the provisions of
the code a genuine construction in the light of their purpose. 13 The
general recognition the Code has received as a major improvement in
Louisiana's legal system has constituted a positive assurance that the
fears voiced of the harmful consequences of such an undertaking were
insubstantial and unreal. The reaction of judges, district attorneys and
even counsel for the defense has been particularly gratifying.
Under the Criminal Code of 1942 criminal law administration in
Louisiana has been greatly improved. Instead of being productive of
confusion as was claimed it has done much to simplify; instead of creating uncertainty it has brought assurance; and the envisioned difficulties
of adjusting to the new system have not materialized. It is perhaps not
too much to believe that the outspoken opponents and the enervating
skeptics as well would not now return to the old order.
Court, 5 LA. L. REV. 236-241 (1943); 5 LA. L. REv. 554-558 (1944); 6 LA. L. REv. 173-182
(1945) ; 7 LA. L. REv. 288-292 (1947); 8 LA. L. REv. 281-287 (1948); 9 LA. L. Rev. 247-252
(1949) ; 10 LA. L. REv. 19S-205 (1950).
13. State v. Almokary, 212 La. 783, 33 So. 2d 519 (1947) ; State v. Bessor, 213 La. 299,
34 So. 2d 785 (1948) ; State v. Logan, 213 La. 451, 34 So. 2d 921 (1948).

